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This project is dived into two sections.  The first section is a comparison between the 
NBA and WNBA, using performance metrics from game statists.  Using performance 
characteristics, empirical analysis was used to determine if the number of minutes played was 
determined by consistent parameters across these organizations.  This finding showed 
inconsistency.  The WNBA showed higher valuation for blocks, steals, and assists while the 
NBA showed higher valuation for three-point percentages and defensive rebounds. 
The second section of the paper evaluates the sunk cost fallacy and its impacts in the 
NBA.  The WNBA was not able to be included in this part of the study due to lack of salary data.  
The sunk cost fallacy is described as; as the spending for a person or thing increases, the 
perceived need to get the most out of that financial decision increases.  It was found that a 1% 
increase in salary statistically increases minutes played by 1.5 minutes.  This reveals that the 
sunk cost fallacy could be at play in the NBA, however more investigation is needed to make 
more firm conclusions   
Introduction  
On December 1, 2012, the New York Times reported that the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) fined the Spurs for “sending starters home”. This fine totaled $250,000 and 
was defined as a “disservice” fee for head coach Greg Popovich’s decision to rest their “Big 
Three” during a regular season road game against Miami. The decision by Coach Popovich 
highlights that decisions of who plays and for how long is more complex than simply a 
measurement of the productivity of the players. Ben Shields and Paul Michelman, of 
COUNTERPOINTS, analyzed the connections between the financial aspect of the league and the 
total number minutes each player gets. Michelman and Shields discussed what occurred when 
Greg Popovich decided to bench his “Big Three”, Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, and Tony Parker, 
in a 2012 regular season game against the Heat. Popovich appeared to want to rest his three super 
star players during this less competitive game, for their own health’s sake, while also giving 
other members of the team the opportunity to play. However, this decision had a ripple effect 
that Popovich did not intend. The commissioner of the NBA fined Popovich’s team, the Spurs, a 
quarter of a million dollars for what Popovich felt was a “strategic” decision. Fans of the 
opposing team were angered by Popovich’s decision and sued the NBA for what they felt was an 
unfair act.  This lawsuit was eventually dropped, but the message sent to the NBA was not soon 
forgotten. This example illustrates how minutes played by NBA players might be linked to how 
much they are paid. This is practice, however, still occurs. Boren (2017) reported in the 
Washington Post, Greg Popovich and the Spurs were the catalyst for many coaches in the years 
following that event to rest their top players despite the negative reaction they knew they would 
receive. 
Another instance where the league punished a team for resting their top players happened 
with the Cleveland Cavaliers in 2017. During a regular season game against the Los Angeles 
Clippers Coach Tyronn Lue decided to rest their teams’ “big three” which consisted of Lebron 
James, Kevin Love, and Kyrie Irving. This caused an outrage with the NBA analysts as well as 
by Doc Rivers, the coach of the Clippers. The complaint by many sports analysts such as Jeff 
Van Gundy was that they advertised one game, with big names, and then once the tickets were 
purchased and people were already sitting in the stadium, they switched out the players. He 
claimed it was false advertising and would not be tolerated in any other industry. The general 
manager of the Cavaliers was not pleased with the decision either, showing that this decision had 
come directly from the coach and not the administration. This situation occurred another time 
with Steve Kerr resting his top stars of the Golden State Warriors, Steph Curry, Draymond 
Green, Klay Thompson, and Andre Iguodala. In this instance they lost the game against the 
Spurs calling the decision into question.  
Based on these events, two major questions come to light.  The first is how the number of 
minutes played by players is determined.  This productivity assessment will be addressed in Part 
I of this paper using data from both the NBA and WNBA.  The second is whether playing 
decisions utilize the sunk cost fallacy, where salary is a determining factor in playing time.  
Although this question is equally important in the WNBA, individual salary statistics are not 
public, therefore this this question will only be addressed using data from the NBA.  However, 
results will be used to draw inferences about the WNBA.   
 
 
SECTION I:  An Economic Analysis of Minutes Played in the NBA and WNBA 
Literature Review  
 The determination of value can come in many forms, however for a top athlete value can 
be seen though usage.  A highly valuable player will find themselves being utilized more than a 
less valuable player.  Berri (1999) looked to analyze how to determine a player’s value.  This 
research found that “most valuable” is not defined as ‘most popular’, ‘most talented’, or ‘most 
prolific scorer’. Rather, most valuable is simply defined as the player whose production is 
estimated to represent the most wins.”.  Berri created several econometric models; per-minute 
production, per-minute team tempo factor, per-minute team defense factor, and production of 
wins. All these models used statistics, both offensive and defensive, from NBA players who 
played from the 1994-1995 season to the 1997-1998 season. Berri’s research concluded that 
there is one way to analyze “value”. He found that the marginal value of each productivity 
statistic is an important contributor.  Berri argues that this value is different based on the team. 
Essentially, a player’s marginal value will depend on the skill level of their teammates. However, 
Berri also stated that it would be misleading and incorrect to surmise a player’s value from points 
scored or given up because basketball is a team sport. The main finding from Berri (1999) is that 
the empirical value of an NBA player can be determined and therefore used to determine worth. 
 Minutes have been observed to be a very important metric for determining value in 
professional basketball. Minutes are effective in measuring a player’s long-term productivity, 
usage rate, and production curve (Page, Barney, McGuire, 2013). In their model, they wanted to 
estimate the players long term production curves, in order to observe what effect position, usage 
rate, and minute played has on the individual curves. By estimating their model using a 
hierarchical Bayes model regression and Gaussian Process they were able to estimate the entire 
career production curve. They did not want to just focus on the “prime” point in a player’s 
careers in order to get a full picture of their production. Through their investigation they 
concluded that players with high minutes and high usage rates, have more dramatic changes over 
their career compared to those with low minutes. This implies that a player who is getting a lot of 
minutes, is going to see more dramatic shifts because of the wear and tear on their body.  
 In a similar study, (Page, Fellingham, and Reese, 2007), they looked at what skills each 
positions needs most to contribute to a team’s success. Both (Page, Fellingham, Reese, 2007) and 
(Berri, 1999) hoped to find a correlation between the productivity of an individual player and 
team wins. Berri was able to link individual NBA statistics to their team’s success with his 
regression model. This study also utilizes NBA player statistics, 10 different performance 
variables, and also a hierarchical Bayes model to estimate position specific skills contributions to 
wins. The results indicated that for all positions out assisting their opponents had very positive 
results on team wins, and in general players who are able to preform multiple skills/ multiple 
positions are more valuable. In all of these studies, they used player statistics, relative data, a 
regression model created to estimate value. Value of professional basketball players can be 
determine in multiple different ways, with a many different focuses, but the centralized method 
is the same.  
Comparison of WNBA and NBA  
At first glance it could be surmised there are few differences between the NBA and 
WNBA.  However, upon further investigation the first difference is size of the league.  The NBA 
is a larger organization than the WNBA.  The WNBA includes fewer teams and players.  To 
uncover whether statistical differences between the leagues exist, apart from the personal 
differences, a two-sided t-test was computed between the average statistics of the NBA and the 
WNBA. This type of test is used to determine whether to reject or fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the means of the two variables are the same. If the means are the same, the 
variables are not statistically different.  However, if the means are not the same it provides 
evidence that the variables are statistically different. The results of these tests are included in 
Table 1 below.   
Table 1 Two-Sided t-test between NBA and WNBA 
 
From this table it can be noted that Minutes is only variable that is not statistically different 
between the NBA and WNBA. To dive into these differences more summary statistics were 
computed.  Table 2 and Table 3 can be used to show that WNBA players average more minutes 
per player as well as a better field goal percentage and free throw percentage per player.  
Table 2 Summary Statistics for WNBA Productivity Measurements 
Statistic 
WNBA 
N Mean St. 
Dev. 
Max Min Median Pctl(25) Pctl(75) 
  
Year 289 2015 0.5 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 
MIN 289 19.59 8.19 34.7 2.4 18.9 12.9 27 
FGM 289 2.77 1.73 8.5 0 2.5 1.4 3.8 
FGA 289 6.41 3.77 19.4 0.4 5.8 3.5 8.4 
FGPCT 289 42.34 8.35 66.5 0 41.8 37.9 47.1 
THREEPM 289 0.49 0.55 2.7 0 0.3 0 0.9 
THREEPA 289 1.5 1.53 7.7 0 1.1 0.1 2.5 
THREEPPCT 289 22.86 17.0
4 
100 0 27.9 0 34.5 
FTM 289 1.53 1.24 6.7 0 1.2 0.6 2.1 
  MIN FGPCT 3PA FTPCT PTS REB 
WNBA Avg. 19.59 41.85 0.25 74.40 3.15 2.30 
NBA Avg. 18.65 25.2 0.30 45.40 15.05 2.85 
p-value 0.44 0.0016 0.00000023 0.0000072 0.014 0.019 
FTA 289 1.92 1.46 7 0 1.5 0.8 2.5 
FTPCT 289 76.72 15.0
6 
100 0 79.2 71.4 85.7 
OREB 289 0.86 0.67 3.1 0 0.7 0.4 1.2 
DREB 289 2.39 1.55 8.9 0.1 2.1 1.3 3.1 
REB 289 3.25 2.1 10.1 0.1 2.8 1.8 4.2 
AST 289 1.64 1.26 6.3 0 1.3 0.6 2.3 
STL 289 0.71 0.44 2.3 0 0.6 0.4 1 
BLK 289 0.4 0.51 4 0 0.2 0.1 0.5 





Table 3 Summary Statistics for NBA Productivity Measurements 
Statistic NBA N Mean St. 
Dev. 
Max Min Median Pctl(25) Pctl(75) 
         
Year 962 2015 0.5 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 
MIN 962 20.03 9.14 42.4 0.8 19.8 12.9 27.6 
FGM 962 3.12 2.11 10.3 0 2.6 1.5 4.3 
FGA 962 6.93 4.47 24 0 5.9 3.6 9.4 
FGPCT 962 44.18 9.47 100 0 44 40 48.48 
THREEPM 962 0.73 0.74 5.1 0 0.5 0.1 1.2 
THREEPA 962 2.08 1.91 11.2 0 1.65 0.5 3.27 
THREEPPCT 962 27.37 15.55 100 0 32.55 22.05 37.1 
FTM 962 1.43 1.37 9.2 0 1 0.5 1.8 
FTA 962 1.89 1.69 10.9 0 1.4 0.8 2.5 
FTPCT 962 71.89 18.35 100 0 75.65 66.7 82.7 
OREB 962 0.86 0.77 4.9 0 0.6 0.3 1.2 
DREB 962 2.73 1.79 10.3 0 2.4 1.5 3.5 
REB 962 3.59 2.42 14.8 0 3.05 1.9 4.7 
AST 962 1.83 1.76 11.7 0 1.2 0.6 2.3 
STL 962 0.64 0.42 2.1 0 0.6 0.3 0.9 
BLK 962 0.4 0.43 3.7 0 0.3 0.1 0.5 
PTS 962 8.39 5.86 31.6 0 7 4.03 11.1 
 
Referring to Table 1, the null hypothesis in this case was that the mean of the variable for 
the WNBA is the same as the mean of the variable for the NBA. The level of significance used is 
99%. For minutes, the p-value is greater than .10 therefore we fail to the null hypothesis that the 
means are statistically the same. For FGPCT, 3PPCT, FTPCT, PTS, and REB the p-value is less 
than 0.10, so we reject the null hypothesis that the means of these variables are statistically the 
same. What this data indicates is that all variables except minutes are statistically different 
between the NBA and WNBA. What these statistics indicates is that on average players in the 
WNBA had a better shot accuracy than the NBA players, however the NBA had higher three-
point percentage, points, and rebounds. Leavy (2015) observed that men shot more 3 pointers 
than the women because of the different ways they play the game. In the WNBA, the 3-point 
shot has been de-incentivized by making the point gain worth less for the risk of taking the shot. 
Analysists claim that one difference between the WNBA and the NBA is the difference of the 
emphasis on game play versus entertainment. The WNBA contracts are not nearly as large as 
NBA contracts.  Additionally, in the NBA much of the game has shifted to accommodate what 
the fans want to see. NBA fans are looking for entertainment, and so the NBA has adapted from 
a more game play focused event to something else entirely. The line between positions has been 
blurred, and the number one focus seems to fall on shooting. In fact, coaches may be putting too 
much focus on scoring and misusing their players skills to see them shooting more baskets 
(Hinton, Sun 2019).  
The difference between the way the game is played between the leagues can be attributed 
to the different rules and regulations that the women and men play with. The ball that the women 
play with is smaller than what the men play with. The ball for WNBA and women’s NCAA 
basketball has a circumference of 28.5 inches while the circumference for the NBA is 29 7/8th 
inches. This difference in size does not just apply to the basketballs. The women’s 3-point line is 
19 feet 9 inches in distance from the hoop, while the NBA line is 22 feet. Additionally, the 
shooting lane on WNBA courts is 12 feet wide, 4 feet narrower than in the NBA. These 
differences have been a part of the game since the WNBA’s beginning in 1996. This information 




The differences in the sport can be traced back to women’s beginnings in sport. In fact, 
when women started making their way into the world of football in Europe, they were met with 
intense opposition. In the text Futbolera by Brenda Elsey and Joshua Nadel an in-depth history is 
provided about how difficult it was for women to break into the world of football (American 
Soccer) for women, and all the criticism and discrimination they faced.  The author details what 
the Brazilian government wanted to do for a physical education program for women, which 
followed the Swedish model. Essentially, they wanted to allow women to only participate in 
sports such as gymnastics and dance or walking and light jogging. This was to help maintain 
their “feminine physique” and teach them how to be graceful. Despite this plan, many women in 
Brazil pursued soccer as it was a very popular sport in their country. They were mocked for 
being too manly, and often time were only able to secure playing time at circuses. The belief was 



















30 sec 22 yrs. 12 max 
NBA 29.87 in  48 mins 22 ft  16 ft 
wide 
24 sec  19 yrs. 15 max 
not agree with the female identity. The connection back to the WNBA is that most female sports 
were created after the men had been playing for years, and they were “adapted” for the women 
so that they wouldn’t be as intense or as “masculine”. The remnants of this are the smaller 
equipment  and court in the WNBA, which is justified today by the thought that on average 
women have smaller hands. Nadel and Elsey feel that these types of differences are simply 
justifications to maintain the suppression of women’s sports and idea of superiority of men in 
sports. (Nadel and Elsey, 2019)  
Data  
The data that will be used in the first section of this study was compiled from NBA.stats 
and WNBA.stats. The data includes all players and their statistics from the 2015-2016 and 2016-
2017 seasons. Table 5 lists the variables that will be used in the model.  It is important to note 
that all of these variables are the relative averages per game calculated from an entire season of 
data for each player. The reason relative averages are so important is because it provides data 
that takes into account the variation in a player’s performance over time and based on their 
specific position. We cleaned the data, and formatted it with the variables that we needed, in 
relative form, as well as with the players who played under our minute’s threshold removed.  
Table 5.  
Variable Description 
MIN average minutes played per game  
FGPCT field goal percentage per game  
THREEPA average three-point attempts per game 
FTPCT average free throw percentage per game 
REB average number of rebounds per game 
AST average number of assists per game 
STL average number of steals per game 
BLK average number of blocks per game  
FGA average number of field goals attempted per game 
(shots not including free throws)  
THREEPPCT average three-point percentage per game  
OREB average number of offensive rebounds per game 
DREB Average number of defensive rebounds per game  
 In order to adjust for outlier bias, players who averaged less than 5 minutes per game 
were excluded.  Linear models were run, one using the data for the WNBA and one using the 
data from the NBA, with minutes as the dependent variable and productivity measurements as 
the independent variables. The independent variables were THREEPPCT, FGPCT, FTPCT, 
BLK, STL, AST, OREB, and DREB.   
Results 
The variables THREEPPCT, and FGPCT were not significant in the WNBA model while STL 
and both OREB and DREB were significant at the 99% level. The NBA model saw 
THREEPPCT significant at the 99% level, but FGPCT was also not significant. Another 
interesting conclusion from this data is that both leagues has very similar FTPCT, which for both 













Econometric Testing and Conclusion 
 In order to assess the strength of both of these models, there was several econometric tests 
performed. Both models were tested for serial correlation, multicollinearity, specification error, and 
heteroskedasticity. In the WNBA model, the Ramsey reset result in a p-value less than .05, which 
indicates an error with the specification of  the model. This is not unexpected because when working with 
data in the realm of professional sports, there are so many small variables that we either unable to control 
for or unable to observe. The Durbin-Watson test was preformed and with a low p-value, this is evidence 
that the model has serial correlation among the variables. This again is not surprising, because the 
variables we used are game statistics, which can overlap in areas. The Breusch-Pagan test also resulted in 
WNBA Model   NBA Model  
a low p-value indicating the model has heteroskedasticity. In order to correct for the serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity the coeftest was ran in R to generate new corrected coefficients and standard errors for 
the model. The same tests were performed on the NBA model, with very similar results. There were also 
mis-specification issues, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation. The reasoning behind this is the same 
as for the WNBA, there are so many variables we were not able to control for or cannot be measured and 
the metrics used to measure performance overlap in several areas. The variance inflation factors for all 
variables for both models were below 5, which indicates that there is not multicollinearity in either model. 
The heteroskedastic and serial correlation corrected coefficients and standard errors were also generated 
for the NBA model.  
 The differences among men’s and women’s sports is always a very interesting topic to research. 
In this capacity, we were interested in observing the statistical differences between how female pro-
basketball players perform compared to men, as well as how the productivity metrics interacted with 
minutes between the leagues. Some notable conclusions were that women averages more minutes per 
game than men, but men average high points scored per game. The way these variables influences 
minutes was more difficult to determine due to the inconsistency of minutes between positions. After 
observing the way these specific variables interact with the minutes a professional basketball player is 
given, we were interested to investigate the value of a player even further. If analyzing how their minutes 
player is or isn’t affected by the players performance metrics, the next logical step is to bring salary into 
the equation. Unfortunately, we were not able to continue the regression with the WNBA because after 
researching, contacting experts, and digging on all WNBA sites, the salaries for the women are simply not 
readily available for the public to see. The following section of this paper is focused on how players 
performance effects their salary, through the lens of the sunk-cost effect. This was a topic that came up in 
further research on economic questions about professional sports. The analysis we completed is not 
focused on making specific policy recommendations, but rather to study and observe how this economic 
and psychological effect exists in the world of professional basketball. 
SECTION II:  An Empirical Investigation of the Sunk Cost Fallacy in the NBA 
Sunk Cost Introduction 
The desire to have highly paid players in the game has more than one motivation. One 
motivation may be related to the sunk cost fallacy.  The sunk cost fallacy is described as; as the 
spending for a person or thing increases, the perceived need to get the most out of that financial 
decision increases.  It is well explained how this theory presents itself in professional basketball 
by Hinton and Sun (2019). Sunk costs are costs that once incurred, cannot be recovered. The 
sunk cost fallacy is when decision makers ignore this fact and continue to include them when  
making economic decisions.   This section of the paper aims to find what role the sunk cost 
fallacy plays in the minutes played by NBA players. In the NBA this can be seen in situations 
where highly paid players get more minutes simply because the organization diverted a larger 
portion of their team salary towards this player.  The fallacy is seen where the highest paid 
players receive the most minutes, regardless of productivity, to feel as though some of this cost is 
being recovered 
Literature Review 
Research has been conducted to uncover if the sunk cost fallacy exists.  A reason why 
NBA teams may be falling victim to the sunk cost fallacy so often could have something to do 
with the elusive goal of creating a “winning” franchise. Staw and Hoang (1995) mention that 
there have been several studies on why people continue to throw money at a goal even if its not 
going to change the results, (see Staw and Ross, 1987, 1989; Brockner, 1992), and with the 
NBA, in particular, most operate under the assumption that spending more money on big name 
players will result in improving a team’s performance. This study by Staw and Hoang(1995) 
used players draft order as their initial cost measurement, and then analyzed the influence this 
initial cost had on a player’s utilization by a team.  
“Because of the vagaries of forecasting talent, teams may have invested more in some 
players than is merited by their performance on the basketball floor. Therein lies the 
sunk-cost dilemma. Do teams use players they have expended the most resources to 
attract, even if their performance does not warrant it? Likewise, do teams retain high-cost 
players, beyond the level warranted by their performance on the court” (Staw and Hoang, 
1995)  
Staw and Hoang (1995) used minutes played as the dependent variable, and then as 
independent variables they used a performance index they created from gathering player 
statistics. This research found that scoring was the performance variable most associated with 
higher minutes. Additionally, they found that draft order was “a significant predictor of minutes 
player over the entire five-year period [that they had data from].” With every one-unit decrease 
in draft number, the players minutes in their second year decreased by up to 23%. This study 
looked at 5 consecutive years following players being drafted, and they found that the draft 
number was a significant factor up to 5 years later. . 
The existence of the sunk cost fallacy is seen through the results of study done by Hinton 
and Sun (2019). This research looked at the effect of player salary on player utilization in the 
NBA. Their research looked at the sunk cost fallacy when dealing with NBA player salaries in 
relation to players minutes. A fixed effects model holding constant player performance and 
comparing salary to minutes was analyzed.  It was found that salary should have no effect on 
playing time IF teams are able to ignore sunk costs. They found that the coefficient for the 
variable ln(salary) to be positive 0.824 and significant at the 5% level when looking at win 
shares per 48 minutes without a lagged experience variable. The meaning behind this coefficient 
is that salary increases by 8.2% for each one unit contributed to win shares.  It was also found 
ln(salary) was significant at the 5% level with a positive coefficient of 1.15 when a lagged 
variable for experience was included. The author concluded that the sunk cost fallacy exists in 
the NBA even when the other factors that contribute to game time are considered.  The fact that 
the variable for salary is affected by the model when player performance is held constant 
indicates that there are other variables effecting salary outside of player performance statistics. 
This finding supports the conclusion that when a player is paid more in the NBA, they are played 
based off what the team “should” get out of the player due to their salary.  
In a well renowned paper on the theory of sunk cost, Arker and Blumer (1985) 
demonstrate an economic motivation behind sunk cost. The figure below is called the value 
function of prospect theory. This graph models the value, gains, and losses that a person feels 
while making economic decisions.  
This graph demonstrates that when 
someone is already at a perceived “loss”, 
they are more willing to take other small 
losses to reach a bigger gain. Someone who 
has just paid a sunk cost would be at point 
B, feeling as though they have already lost 
something due to these non-recoupable costs. They want to get themselves to a large gain to 
compensate for their costs, so they are more willing to expend more small losses, or sunk costs in 
order to get the most “bang for their buck”. How this comes into play in the NBA is with 
contracts being signed before players begin their time with the team. NBA team managers make 
the decisions on how much money to spend on what players before the player has performed for 
them. Theses sunk costs are then what motivates the players minutes, because the franchise is 
unable to escape the feeling of loss. They are then also willing to continue spending money on 
these players, such as training costs and game bonuses, if they believe it will get their players to 
a top level of performance that will then get them the most out of their “investment”.  
 Garland (1990) researched the idea that sunk cost influences a person’s decision to 
escalate a commitment to an ongoing project. This is an that could apply to NBA team decisions, 
as discussed above with the value function of prospect theory. If players are paid their contract 
salary, and it is a sunk cost, then the team manager might feel inclined to continue spending on 
that player to assure that they see a profitable return on their investment.  
Data   
The data for the model was retrieved from NBA.com/stats. The player statistics from the 
years 2016, 2017, and 2018 were gathered, and cleaned. The individual player salaries per year 
were taken from basketballreference.com and added to the data set. We then generated the 
relative statistics in R, using the original data and the equation for relative player statistics from 
David Berri. Log of wage is the dependent variable, and the performance statistics of the players 
will be the independent variables. The reason for this is to find how the players performance and 
minutes correlate to their salary, and to observe what patterns, arise from higher salaries players. 
Once the connection between player salary and minutes is established, it will be possible to look 
at specific variables to see if certain positions indicate more minutes played. If a player has 
performance statistics that do not correlate with higher minutes, but they do have a very high 










This regression yielded some significant results. We observed that the variable logwage is 
significant at the 99% level, and the coefficient indicates that for everyone on unit increase in the 
players wage correlates with a 1.53% increase in relative minutes played per game. Based on the 
research on sunk cost and its effect in the NBA, this unexplained increase in minutes with higher 
salary could be an indication of the sunk cost fallacy in effect. If a player is receiving more 
minutes with an increase in wage this could indicate the general manager trying to recoup these 
sunk costs, by getting more minutes out of higher paid players.  
 
 
*The team and positions were controlled for using 
dummy variables 
Econometric Testing 
 In order to test the legitimacy of our model further we preformed a fixed effects and 
random effects model, as well as the econometric testing for multicollinearity, serial correlation, 
omitted variable bias, and heteroskedasticity. The fixed effects model is used to remove omitted 
variable bias over time by using dummy variables for the missing characteristics. A random 
effects model is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the data, and since our data has 
so many different individuals there are countless factors that we did not observe. After using 
both the fixed and random effects model, a Hausman test was preformed, and this tells us which 
estimator is more consistent. Based on the results of the Hausman test we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects and therefore use fixed effects. In order to 
test our model for a specification error, the Ramsey reset test was performed. The p-value for this 
test was well below .05, which means we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the value of the 
coefficients is equal to zero and the model is mis-specified. It makes sense for there to be mis-
specification issues with the regression because there are many small variables that we were not 
able to control for in this instance.  To test our model for serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson 
test was preformed in R. The Breusch-Pagan test was also performed to test the model for 
heteroskedasticity, and the p value was very small indicating this problem existed in our model 
as well. Using the coeftest in R we were able to generate coefficient and standard errors that were 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.. Finally, the model was tested for 
multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factors of all the independent variables. 
The variables rel_astm, rel_tovm, and rel_ftm all had variance inflation factors over 5, which 
indicates there could be a multicollinearity issue with these three variables.  
Ramsey Reset Test  
 
Durbin-Watson Test  
 
Breusch-Pagan Test  
 





 Through our research on the sunk cost fallacy’s presence in the NBA, several interesting 
conclusions could be drawn. The fact that the log of wage variable is so statistically significant in 
our regression was evidence that pointed to the sunk cost fallacy influencing salary in the NBA. 
Our model had relative minutes set as the dependent variable, and so the logwage variable being 
significant was an important relationship for this model.  The coefficient on logwage of 1.52 
indicates that with a 1% increase in salary there is a 1.52 minute increase in a players minutes, 
keeping constant all performance metrics. The entire theory of the sunk cost fallacy is that when 
we pay recoupable costs, we feel as though we are at a loss now and need to make sure we get 
“the most bang for our buck” even though there is no way to actually get back the sunk costs 
already spent. If teams are putting a hefty amount of money into specific player contracts, then 
they will feel the need to pressure the coaches into giving that player more minutes in order to 
get the most out of their sunk cost. The aim of this study was not to be able to give concrete 
policy recommendations but rather to investigate this phenomenon in professional sports. The 
results of our regression are not concrete evidence, but they indicate an unexplained positive 
relationship between minutes and salary. Further investigation would require looking even more 
in-depth on the factors that contribute to player minutes, salary and any outside factors that may 
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